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This allows the attacker to requestĪnd obtain an access token in steps (5) and (6), respectively. Once it does so, the malicious app is now able to intercept theĪuthorization code in step (4). Handler for the custom scheme in addition to the legitimate OAuth 2.0Īpp. Note that it is possible for a malicious app to register itself as a Requester via the Redirection Endpoint URI that was provided in step In step (4), the Authorization Code is returned to the The authorization server returns the authorization code TLS, this communication is protected by TLS and cannot be The request then gets forwarded to the OAuth 2.0Īuthorization server in step (2). Intercepted, though it may potentially be observed in advanced attack Step (1) happens through a secure API that cannot be The Redirection Endpoint URI in this case typically uses a custom URI In step (1), the nativeĪpplication running on the end device, such as a smartphone, issuesĪn OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request via the browser/operating system. Once the attacker has gained access to the authorization code, it canįigure 1 shows the attack graphically. Not protected by Transport Layer Security (TLS), such as inter-Īpplication communication within the client's operating system. Returned from the authorization endpoint within a communication path In this attack, the attacker intercepts the authorization code OAuth 2.0 public clients are susceptible to the Example for the S256 code_challenge_method. Notes on Implementing Base64url Encoding without Server Verifies code_verifier before Returning the Client Sends the Authorization Code and the Code Client Sends the Code Challenge with theĪuthorization Request. The Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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Include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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Code Components extracted from this document must Please review these documentsĬarefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Information about the current status of this document, any errata,Īnd how to provide feedback on it may be obtained atĬopyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Received public review and has been approved for publication by the It represents the consensus of the IETF community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force This is an Internet Standards Track document. Specification describes the attack as well as a technique to mitigateĪgainst the threat through the use of Proof Key for Code Exchange Susceptible to the authorization code interception attack. OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing the Authorization Code Grant are
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Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients Request for Comments: 7636 Nomura Research Institute Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) N.
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